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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION WAS NOT 
TREATED AS A SINGLE PARCEL BY THE PARTIES 
The first argument proposed by Appellee Spendlove suggests 
that the property in question was treated as one parcel by the 
parties and as such was not subject to sale as multiple parcels 
pursuant to the holding of Commercial Bank of Utah v. Madsen, 23 6 
P.2d. 343 (Utah 1951). Appellants, (collectively referred to as 
Hatch) contend that the property was not treated as one parcel and 
that Commercial is distinguishable from the case before the court. 
Spendlove argues that his "one parcel" position is evidenced 
by the fact that the parcel was always described in the various 
deeds as one legal description. However, Hatch would contend that 
often large parcels of property are described as one parcel for 
purposes of convenience. For example, if a parcel of land had been 
divided into 500 lots it would not be expected that a deed 
transferring title would contain 500 separate legal descriptions. 
A party would be more likely to provide a legal description 
covering the outside boundary of the property. Accordingly, the 
fact that the property was only described as one parcel in the 
various deeds is not necessarily indicative of the number of 
parcels contained within the property. 
In addition, the facts of the case indicate that the property 
was treated as more than one parcel by both parties. The " Second 
Amendment To The Trust Deed Note and Escrow Agreement" executed 
February 15, 1985 (Rec I at 22) indicates that "Hatch shall be 
entitled to a partial release of 2 acres for every $12,000 of 
principal which is reduced against the initial principal sum . . .". 
A similar provision is found in the " Third Amendment To Trust Deed 
Note And Escrow Agreement" (Rec I at 106) executed on April 29, 
1986. In that agreement the trustee is empowered to release 
portions of the encumbered property from the effect of the 
Agreement and Note, in two acre increments...". In addition, 
paragraphs 4, 5, & 6 of said agreement acknowledges that third 
party purchasers of the smaller parcels may make payments directly 
to Spendlove. The only purpose of this document is to provide a 
means by which two acre parcels may be released from the original 
trust deed. Clearly, Spendlove was not treating the property as 
one parcel when he executed these agreements. 
In addition, the fact that Spendlove names subsequent owners 
as defendants to this action is further indication that Spendlove 
knew that the property had been divided into several lots. 
Finally, the county records reflect that the property had been 
divided in to several parcels. The plat map for the Washington 
Counts Tax Assessor (Rec II at 3 02) reveals that the property had 
been divided into smaller parcels and acknowledged that each of the 
defendants held an interest in one of the lots. Hatch contends 
that the property was therefore known to consist of several parcels 
and as such should have been sold pursuant to the direction of the 
judgement debtor. 
Based upon the foregoing evidence Spendlove should not have 
2 
been allowed to change his position and assert that the property 
was one parcel of land, at the Sherifffs sale. 
II 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE PROVIDE 
A REASONABLE MEANS OF RECONCILING 
THE APPARENT CONFLICT BETWEEN 
SECTION 78-37-6 AND RULE 69 
The second and third arguments presented in Spendlove1s brief 
recognizes the apparent conflict between Section 78-37-6 Utah Code 
Annotated (empowering the courts to determine the parcels and order 
of sale) and Section 78-37-1 Utah Code Annotated and Rule 69, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure (empowering the judgment debtor to direct 
the order of sale). Spendlove urges that the authority given to 
the courts overrides the authority given to the judgment debtor. 
This position, however, is not supported by any authority or 
precedent. As a rule of law, when statutes are in apparent 
conflict, every effort should be made to interpret the statutes in 
harmony with each other. Murray City v. Hall 663 P.2d 1314, (Utah 
1983) . 
Hatch contends that this court should attempt to harmonize the two 
statutes in question rather than support one statute and disregard 
the other. While a potential for conflict between the statutes 
may in theory exist, the facts of this case allow the court to 
harmonize the respective statutes. 
Spendlove contends that the court ordered the property in 
question to be sold as a single parcel. However, this is not the 
case. A careful review of the Order of Sale (Rec II at 23 6) 
reveals that the court made no specific order regarding the 
existence of parcels or the order of their sale. The court simply 
stated that the Sheriff of Washington County should "sell the 
premises described in said Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure .... 
and you shall do all things according to the terms and requirements 
of said Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, and the applicable 
provisions and requirements of law". 
The court did not expressly find that the property consisted 
of one parcel. In fact the court did not make any finding at all 
regarding the number of parcels found within the described 
property, instead it issued a general order to sell the property in 
question. Hatch contends that when the court fails to exercise 
it's authority to determine the parcels and order of sale, 
pursuant to Section 78-37-6, the judgment debtor should be free to 
make such a determination at the sale pursuant to Rule 69 and 
Section 78-37-1. 
This approach provides a means of harmonizing the conflicting 
provisions of the law and does little violence to either statute. 
By comparison, if we adopt the position suggested by Spendlove, 
(i.e. that the general language contained in this Order constitutes 
a direction to sell as one parcel) then the court, in effect, 
rescinds the rights granted to judgment debtors since all mortgage 
sales originate with am initial court order directing the sale of 
property. 
Ill 
THE SHERIFF'S SALE WAS UNFAIR 
AND RESULTED IN INJURY TO APPELLANTS 
Argument IV of Spendlovefs brief argues that Hatch must show 
that the result of a sale was unfair in order to justify setting 
aside the Sheriff's Sale, Appellants have addressed the issues of 
unfairness and the way that the sale, as conducted, interferes with 
Appellants right to redeem the property, in their opening brief. 
Spendlove has presented a dissertation of the law but has not 
refuted the appellants position that their redemption rights were 
restricted by selling the property as one parcel. Accordingly, 
since the parties seem to be in agreement on this issue appellants 
position will not be argued further. See, Rule 24(c) Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
IV 
THE PROCEDURAL DEFECTS OF APPELLANTS 
IF ANY, DO NOT JUSTIFY DISMISSAL OF 
THIS CASE 
Appellee next asserts that this appeal should be dismissed for 
several procedural reasons. 
First, Spendlove contends that the case should be dismissed 
for failure of Hatch to file a cost bond. However, Failure to 
file a cost bond is not jurisdictional Mountain States Tel. & Tel. 
Co. v. Atkin, Wright, and Miles, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984). In 
addition, this court has held that a court has discretion to allow 
the filing of a cost bond where no prejudice is shown to the 
respondent, Mountain States at 2 64. Spendlove has not raised any 
objection to the failure to file a cost bond until the filing of 
his brief nearly one year after this appeal was filed. More 
importantly he has not shown that he has been prejudiced in any 
way. Appellants stand willing and able to provide the cost bond 
at the courts direction and would ask permission to file the bond 
if the court deems the same to be necessary, 
Spendlove next argues that the appeal should be dismissed as 
a result of Appellants failure to request a transcript. No record 
has been transcribed because their is virtually no record to 
transcribe. In this case, there was no trial on the merits. The 
case was resolved by stipulation. The only record, of any 
substance, would be a record of the hearing on the Motion to Set 
Aside the Sheriff's Sale, however, none of the testimony presented 
at that hearing is being contested. Further the arguments 
presented orally are virtually identical to those presented in 
writing and contained in the court record. Appellants are not 
seeking a determination based upon any testimony or the courts 
ruling as to the admissability of evidence. Appellants are not 
contesting any finding entered by the court. The only issues 
addressed in this appeal relate to the application of law to the 
facts and the lack of specific Findings of Fact. None of the 
issues raised on appeal are assisted by transcription of the very 
limited record in this case. 
Spendlove further contends that without a transcript 
Appellants have not met their burden of showing that the trial 
court erred in its denial of Appellant's Motion to Set Aside 
Sheriff's Sale "particularly as it relates to the trial court's 
factual finding that the Sheriff's Sale was fair and non-
prejudicial to Appellants..." Brief of Appellee, p. 16, (underline 
added). However, Appellee can not cite to signed order wherein 
the court signed any order finding that the sale was fair. The 
transcript of court's ruling from the bench, does not help resolve 
the issues on appeal since the ruling does not have effect until 
reduced to writing, executed by the judge and entered in the 
records of the court. 
This same argument applies to Spendlove1s argument that Hatch 
failed to "marshal the evidence". A marshaling of the evidence is 
only necessary when a party is contending that the court weighed 
the evidence incorrectly making its findings. In this case, Hatch 
contends that the court either failed to make findings completely 
or incorrectly applied the law to the findings. 
Spendlove next complaint that Appellants docketing statement 
was not timely filed. However, Appellants failure to timely file 
the docketing statement did not adversely affect the Appellee and 
did not defeat the purpose of the docketing statement as set forth 
in Rule 9 (b) . Once again Spendlove makes no objection until 
several months after the statement has been filed and accepted by 
the court. It would be unfair to allow Appellants to incur the 
considerable expense of briefing this case and then dismiss the 
same based upon an event to which their was never any objection. 
Appellants contend that Spendlovefs objection to the docketing 
statement is untimely. Finally, the case of Brooks v. Department 
of Emp. Sec. 736 P. 2d 241 (Utah 1987) is not applicable to the 
facts at hand. In Brooks the docketing statement was substantively 
deficient, lacking much of the required information. In this case 
the statement was not deficient in any respect. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments in conjunction with those 
found in Appellants opening brief, Appellants request that this 
court sustain this appeal. 
Dated this 1st day of April, 1992. 
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